Analyzing Our Obsession with Formations: Would 4-4-2 Make a Difference?

Recently, after the defeats against Norwich and Shalke, the 4-4-2 debate has come up again. Fuelled also, in part, by Theo’s contract situation and his desire to play up front. With the team hardly perfect, it makes sense to question our tactics and think up solutions to our problems. But I wonder if it really is as simple as changing our 4-2-3-1 to a 4-4-2. Would it really make a difference? I decided to analyze some of the discussion and see what formations, or changes in formation, would really mean for AFC.

Well, first, do formations really matter? In 2008, Fabio Capello said of formations, “these figures are stupid. In the modern game, the only formation is 9-1.” Well, I guess that answers our question.

Capello was obviously simplifying things a bit, but made a very good point. The game is moving more and more towards universality on the pitch, which means everyone defends and attacks as a unit. Everyone, except maybe the striker, tracks back and defends. When Arsenal lose the ball, you see immediately players get into shape to press the ball, and that starts with Giroud and Cazorla up front. And when the pressing fails, everyone, except perhaps Giroud, is asked to track back and get into a solid defensive shape.

And in attack, the focus is not on staying in straight lines, but rather disrupting them, switching positions, making diagonal runs – keeping a shape in attack becomes counterproductive. It is all about fluidity. Just a few days ago, Wenger said “In our team, we have freedom of movement, nobody is handcuffed. When we have the ball, we have a lot of freedom to move.”

But despite the fluidity of today’s attacks, surely there’s a difference between playing two strikers and just one up top? There are differences, but they are more subtle than that, and one isn’t necessarily better than the other.

“Formations are neutral; it’s their employment that gives them positive or negative characteristics,” says Jonathan Wilson. So a 4-4-2 isn’t any more attacking than a 4-5-1. It depends more on the personnel deployed (is Santos playing on the left win or Gervinho?), and obviously on how much freedom is given to the players to get forward and break the lines. If we are playing a difficult away fixture, perhaps Wilshere would be asked to curb his forward runs and sit next to Arteta to protect the back four. At a home game against a parked bus, he would be given more freedom to get forward and join in the attack. It is subtleties like this which would make a formation more positive or negative. Despite the extra striker, we have seen many examples of an opponent playing 4-4-2 only to sit back and defend against our 4-5-1, as we relentlessly throw men forward.

There are other differences in style and strengths, but in the end the differences aren’t big enough to suggest a drastic change in a team’s fortunes. A 4-5-1 is implicit in a 4-4-2. Drop the second striker a bit deeper into midfield and the change is complete. In fact, we’ve seen us defend in a 4-4-2 shape, with Cazorla up front with the striker ahead of two banks of four.

But from our rigid starting shape, things get muddled as we move forward in possession. Last season, Rosicky spoke of his no.10 role, saying “I start close to van Persie up front, and after that I come a bit deeper to stretch the pitch out.” So a 4-4-2 morphing into a 4-5-1? Perhaps it’s a matter of who plays that role. Bergkamp, naturally a forward, was more likely to stay higher up, closer to the forward, letting the midfield supply him with balls. On the other hand, a midfielder playing in that role might want to move deeper in search of possession.

Or maybe our second strikers are now midfielders because we tend to play strikers on the wings. Last season Gervinho and Walcott flanked van Persie in what Wenger called a “three striker formation.” Even this season we have played at least one of Podolski and Walcott on the flanks. They are direct runners, finishers, instead of creators the way Hleb and Rosicky were.

In our fluid attacking shape, perhaps it doesn’t matter too much what starting position the players are assigned, but maybe it can have some effect on how well a player plays, and how much the team benefits from his qualities. Again, commenting on Walcott, Wenger said that the wing position is changing and that you have to defend a lot more from the wings. That obviously takes away from Walcott’s strength, which is in playing off the shoulder of the defence and making runs in behind. He is a mediocre passer but a composed finisher, so no use playing him far away from goal. The closer he is to goal the likelier he is to get a chance to use his strengths. You could say the same about Podolski – a player described as the most lethal finisher ever by Steve Bould shouldn’t be on the wing, should he?

But in the end, perhaps Wenger has decided the “balance” that Podolski offers on the left is needed more than his finishing up front (and in a fluid system he can get chances there anyway). And Maybe Walcott is better off making diagonal runs from the right until his back-to-goal play (i.e. ball retention) improves.

 I feel Wenger picks the system to fit the players rather than the players to fit the system. It is not about 4-4-2s or 4-5-1s or 3-5-2s, not about “stupid figures,” but rather about players’ strengths and weaknesses and how they can fit together cohesively in a team. So perhaps the discussion shouldn’t be about the superficial numbers but rather about what roles our players should play, or maybe more subtle changes to our style, our positioning, which could get the best out of our team.

Carl Jenkinson Illustrates Fallacy in Criticism of Arsenal’s Spending

We know how good Carl Jenkinson has been this season. I won’t bother preaching to the choir. He’s been immense. So good that Sagna could find himself warming the bench when he’s fit. He has exceeded all expectations any fans had of him.

The majority of the fans weren’t convinced at all of his ability. As a 19 year-old kid, he wasn’t good enough or experienced enough to adequately replace the great Bacary Sagna. We needed a new signing desperately. There were rumors, and clamoring for certain names, but ultimately nothing concrete ever developed. The transfer window ended without us signing a right back, and the fans were incensed.

Arsene Wenger didn’t entirely disagree with the fans regarding Jenkinson’s ability. There is some evidence that Wenger was looking to sign a defender, not least the fact that he said he was looking for one. But he also maintained that we weren’t desperate for signings, that he had a good squad and we would only sign if someone “special” was available. He knew that Sagna’s absence would need to be filled, but perhaps he knew something about Jenkinson that we, the fans, didn’t?

It certainly looks that way now. Jenkinson’s done so well that it’s hard to imagine a new 15 million pound signing coming in and doing any better. Now, of course, he hasn’t been perfect, and he will undoubtedly make mistakes and go through spells of bad form, but as a back up right back we couldn’t have asked for more.

So would spending money on a player have done us any good in this case? The argument made against Wenger this summer was that he had money available for once and he didn’t spend it. He was accused of being overly cautious to the detriment of the team. The logic was, we know the team isn’t good enough, so Wenger should spend.

But what if Wenger thought it was? Or that anyone he signed, like an experienced right back, wouldn’t be any better than a youngster gunning for his chance? Maybe he didn’t spend the money because he thought he really didn’t need to, as his team was good enough to challenge as it was.

The whole departure of Song and emergence of Arteta in the DM role is another illustration of this. So is our team’s good start to the season when people expected much worse.

I believe the reality of what happened this summer is that Wenger decided not to spend because he thought the team as it was could challenge for trophies. He trusted the fitness of Diaby and the progress of Wilshere. He could see the improvement in Ramsey, Jenkinson, and Coquelin on the training ground. He saw the different roles that Gervinho and Arteta could play for us and excel in them.

Wenger decided not to spend not so we could save the money and tuck it away in a vault. He decided not to spend because he had an inkling that Jenkinson could be this good. Perhaps the other players who have yet to convince the fans get their chance, they will continue to prove this point.

And if everything does fall apart, there’s always January to make a panic buy or two.

West Ham v Arsenal – Compensating for Size with Class

“We have many midfielders. But we don’t have many physical midfielders,” Wenger said, rueing the loss of Diaby to a three week injury. It looked like we would be heading to Upton Park with a smallish, physically vulnerable midfield. Not good against a Sam Allardyce side. But as it turned out, we bossed the game anyway. Saw 69% of the ball, won 21 tackles, and had 21 shots (to West Ham’s 9 attempts).

Well, it wasn’t all smooth sailing. They did beat us 58 – 42 on aerial duels. That’s the key stat that defined the game. All game, but the first half especially, a rejuvinated Andy Carroll won 68% of aerial challenges, even with Mertesacker back in the side. He caused us all sorts of problems and West Ham had a host of half-chances from his knock-downs.

And although some may find it ironic that their only goal came from a sweeping move along the floor, it was Mertesacker’s obsession with Carroll that ultimately gave Diame a clear chance to score.

But generally we dealt well with the aerial barrage. Even if Carroll was winning headers, we were picking up the second balls. And when we won the ball, we didn’t give it away, we made things happen.

Arteta completed 111 passes and made 5 tackles. Even won a 100% of his aerial duels. It was, once again, an all around brilliant performance from him. He had a subdued game against Chelsea, which affected our rhythm, but here a much improved Ramsey (who also made 93 passes) created enough of a distraction to allow Arteta to play his game. And those two together built a great platform for Cazorla, Giroud, and Podolski to create.

Wenger has often been criticized for fielding teams that are too small, too technical for the Premier League. The post-invincibles teams were often considered to be too easily bullied. But in adopting a more technical approach all those years ago, Wenger had the right idea. Technique is more important. But he was never able to execute his plan like Barcelona, whose tiny midfielders dominated Europe under Guardiola, and put to rest the idea that speed and strength were more important than technique.

But in the fast paced, physical Premier League, Wenger has always felt the need for taller, more physically robust players. Sometimes even at the expense of technique, as Alex Song’s continual presence in the side showed. But maybe he underestimated the value a technique a bit. Wenger said he didn’t sign Luka Modric because he was too weak for the Premier League. Over the years, the Croatian has developed into a complete midfielder, strong enough for the Premier League. He may not have had the strongest body, but technique and intelligence, coupled with a fighting spirit, meant he was able to dominate most midfields in England.

With the departure of Song (whether forced or not), Wenger has now a more technically solid midfield. Arteta, Ramsey, and Cazorla are all capable of hogging the ball and creating chances. Without Diaby we may have struggled against West Ham, but Arteta’s intelligence and dogged determination in winning his battles more than made up for his lack of height. The same with Ramsey, who is never shies away from tackles (maybe sometimes he’s actually too eager to dive in). And with Cazorla in front of them, who is always buzzing and harrying defenders, we never looked troubled in midfled.

We don’t have any physical midfielders remaining, but if Wenger puts his faith in technique, we may not need any. It wasn’t a perfect performance from our midfield. At times Ramsey left Arteta too isolated, with a sea of space around him for West Ham to exploit. But with games Ramsey will improve, so will Coquelin. Even if Diaby is continued to be sidelined by injury, our diminutive midfielders will do just fine.

(All stats from the brilliant @Whoscored.com).

 

Arsenal v Chelsea: Wenger’s Selection Error Costs us the Game

Dropping Mertesacker must have been difficult for Arsene, and it was a huge risk, but it made sense tactically. When you have three reliable center halves you can, and you should, rotate when needed. Today, however, the tactical move didn’t work, the risk didn’t pay off as Arsenal produced their worst, most error strewn performance so far this season.

One reason we missed the BFG was that Koscielny looked rusty – not quite match fit yet. He made errors against Man City but you would have thought he’d have got them out of his system with that game. But here he was bullied by Torres for the first goal, then his mistake nearly cost us another. And aside from that there were plenty of rushed, missed tackles on Chelsea’s dribblers that allowed them through.

The other reason was tactical. Before the match Wenger talked about how the new Chelsea don’t have the physical presence of the old side. But he may have underestimated them in that regard. Torres up front bossed Vermaelen and Koscielny physically. Cech’s goal kicks were often easily chested down and this helped Chelsea keep possession in dangerous areas. Compare that to previous games where Mertesacker simply head-passed any goal kicks or long balls to one of our midfielders.

And of course, the set pieces, where Mertesacker’s added height might have made the difference. Diaby’s injury didn’t help either.

And higher up the pitch, after Diaby’s substitution  Ramirez and Mikel overpowered Cazorla and Ramsey. Cazorla in particular had a poor performance by his very high standards. Lost the ball too often and wasn’t able to create any good chances for himself or his teammates.

Speaking of losing the ball, that was a theme of Arsenal’s performance today. Credit must be given to Chelsea as they marked us well in midfield and forced errors, but there were too many unforced ones as well. Players over-elaborating in deep areas, trying the hollywood pass instead of laying it off to an open teammate. We kept the ball so well against City and here, our poor passing and lack of height from goal kicks meant we didn’t enjoy as much possession as we’d have liked. What made things further worse was in Diaby we lost a physical ball winner, and Ramsey’s early yellow meant he couldn’t go in strong in challenges.

On another day it could have been different. We had chances (Giroud, I’m looking at you). But as it stands, a good away result has been marred by errors from players and manager. Home form is crucial in title races, and already we’ve dropped 5 points against Sunderland and Chelsea. If we want to be in the mix come May, we have to improve on that. Especially since we find ourselves 7 points adrift of the leaders already.

Arsenal Learning to Control Games Without the Ball

Here are the possession stats from our last two Premier League games:

Arsenal 50% – 50% Southampton
Liverpool 53% – 47% Arsenal

Here are the possession stats for the first two games:

Stoke 33% – 67% Arsenal
Arsenal 70% – 30% Sunderland

There’s an obvious difference. In our first two league games, we dominated possession. In the next two, we conceded a lot more of the ball. There’s an obvious difference between the two sets of games, the fact that we never took the lead against Stoke and Sunderland, but did (and relatively early) against Liverpool and Southampton. Maybe four games is still too early to judge, but I think there is a trend developing. Arsenal are learning to sit on their leads. Not that we stopped attacking against Liverpool or Southampton, but our approach to the game shifted. We sat back, soaked up the pressure, and let our opponents hand us chances on the break. How many times have we seen teams do that to us in the past? We are now learning to do the same.

There are two ways of controlling the game – with and without the ball. Either you just play keep-ball like Barcelona, or you sit back and deny your opponents space to attack, and hit them on the counter attack. The objective of both tactics is the same – to take advantage of your lead in the best way possible. And it’s important to maintain the attacking aspect of your play. You don’t want endless, aimless possession to bog your game down, and you don’t want to hand the impetus to the opponents by parking the bus. The idea is to force them into taking more risks, doing something desperate in order to reduce the deficit, hence giving you a chance to build further on your lead.

In the past Wenger usually avoided having to alter our approach in the game at any point, even after we took a significant lead (which, sometimes, is just one goal). Late on in games we would often see a defensive winger coming on or another midfielder to kill the game off, but there was never any major changes in tactics. It was always attack, attack, attack. And while “Arsenal can never hold onto leads” was always a myth, you did wonder why we weren’t more pragmatic at times. We’ve certainly punished other teams for not adapting their approach. Back in March, Tottenham took a 0-2 lead, but they were being completely outplayed. Redknapp finally altered his team’s shape in the second half, but by then Arsenal were already level 2-2.

In theory, what Tottenham did in that game should have worked. It is exactly what we did at Anfield and protected our 2-0 lead well. It just goes to show that there’s no one-size-fits-all tactic to protecting leads, it’s all about gauging the situation and responding accordingly.

Liverpool had started the better team at Anfield, but slowly we took over and started creating chances. We ended the game with two defensive wingers and our team pretty much completely surrendering possession to Liverpool. But it was controlled, we knew what we were doing. Despite having 19 shots, only 1 was a clear cut chance. We had created 3.

The key has been our solid defensive shape. We still press the ball, but when we can’t win it back quickly, we are good at dropping back into two banks of four. It’s a tactic Barcelona have exemplified in recent years. We defended deep against Liverpool, whose quick attackers might have caused us problems if given space in behind. Similarly against Southampton, we decided to let them have the ball in deep positions, only squeezing space in our own half. And despite having 50% of the ball, and even scoring a goal, Southampton never created a proper chance.

The deep line may have been suicide at The Brittania. A team whose strength is in the air, you want to keep them as far away from goal as possible. Give them space in behind, as Crouch won’t beat anyone in a sprint, but let him get into the box and his presence there could be deadly. And a team who can hurt you with their long balls, you want to close them down high up, and keep the ball as much as possible. So in this game keeping a solid shape wasn’t as important as pressing, and it was important to defend high up. If we had taken the lead against Stoke, I wouldn’t have expected our approach to change. Maybe we would try to keep the ball even more.

Against Montpellier the sitting back approach wasn’t working either. They were causing us problems. And Steve Bould almost made the mistake Redknapp did. He stuck with the tactic of sitting back and trying to absorb pressure, when really there was too much of it. A switch to a thicker midfield would have allowed us to keep the ball better and relieve some of the pressure, but Ramsey came on too late. But it’s good to know that despite our defence facing a difficult spell, unlike the Spuds, we held on and claimed the 3 points. Another victory for our excellent defensive shape this season. 

As the above  two examples show, it’s not always possible to control the game without the ball, and that’s why the ability to keep the ball is so important. So far we’ve shown this season that when we have needed to, we have kept the ball well and pushed our opponents back. And when we needed to sit back and soak up attacks, we’ve done that well, too. It seems that this season we are showing a willingness to alter our approach and take better advantage of going ahead in a game, even if it means taking the less scenic route and conceding possession.

Stoke vs Arsenal Preview – Time to Banish the Brittania Curse

It’s not much of a curse. But we do have a rather poor record at the Brittania, the home of the Mighty Orcs. We have a good chance to turn that around tomorrow, and I hope we take it. Three things come to mind that help swing things in our favor.

One: our defence looks solid. Last season, when we had most of our defenders fit, we did well defensively (by our standards). Stoke will try their usual method of aerial bombardment but I feel we have gotten increasingly more adept at dealing with them. Szczesny’s fitness will be key (he has a minor knock) as he is extremely comfortable coming out and dealing with set pieces. Mertesacker now adds a bit of height, too, and if Koscielny was available I’d put him on the right just to provide even more aerial prowess to our defence. But as it stands, even with Jenks at RB, we should be OK. We were very solid against Sunderland, and I don’t see why things should change tomorrow.

Two: Wenger has suggested that the best way to deal with Stoke is to keep the ball. Our possession game will be hugely important. Last season we tended to struggle to keep possession in away games, especially without Arteta mashalling the midfield. With the addition of Cazorla and Diaby our midfield has a much more technical look to it, and I think we’ll keep the ball well and make it difficult for Stoke to get the ball let alone create chances. Gervinho and Walcott on the wings might not be the best way to go about the possession tactic, so one of Ramsey or Cazorla could be pushed wide.

Three: The new EPL ruling regarding pitch sizes. The Arsenal Arsenal blog did a great, detailed piece on it (http://arsenalarsenal.wordpress.com/2012/08/22/rule-change-will-stymie-stoke-in-arsenals-favour/). Basically, Stoke, like other clubs, played on a much smaller pitch than Arsenal’s, which gave them an advantage. Now, every club will have to conform to the UEFA regulation pitch size, which would add 800 sq. yards to Stoke’s pitch.  All that extra space will help our players, and it will be a lot more like playing at the Emirates. Besides the booing and abuse and the ugly faces, the Arsenal players should feel right at home, and we know how bad Stoke are when they play us at home. They always get hammered.

But the advantage for Arsenal aside, I’m not a big fan of the new ruling. It allowed for more variety, more diversity in the Premier League, and gave football more character. We’re not big fans of Stoke’s neanderthal approach to football but it makes these games interesting. Their style might be all about brainlessly lumping balls in the air, but you have to be clever to beat them. And yes, I do put the emphasis on cleverness, because trying to beat fire with fire at the Britannia is futile. We have to play our natural game and beat them with our superior technique. So I’m not worried about the size and strength of our midfield, it’s all about how well we can pass the ball tomorrow.

5 Points on Cologne vs Arsenal

This friendly seemed to take forever to arrive. I wanted to see how Podolski and Giroud fit into the line up, how good Cazorla really is in an Arsenal shirt, if RvP plays, and if so, does he wear the arm band, and what influence has Bould had on the team, and if we really are going to play 4-4-2. This friendly would answer all of those questions, at least somewhat. We all know what happened, so need for descriptions of the 4 goals we scored, but here’s 5 interesting things I noticed.

1. Our defensive shape was very much a 4-4-1-1. Yes, we pressed, but when Koln were firmly in possession, we sat back in two banks of four. We tend to defend this way usually in European games so it is certainly interesting that this might be our default shape from now on. It hints at a more cautious defensive approach. Aside from that, there was no real change in our tactics. No sign of that 4-4-2 that everyone seemed to be predicting. Podolski and Giroud both started, but we very much had just one striker up front.

2. Podolski played left wing in the first half. My hope was that Poldi would start on the right, and Theo on the left. Or they would at least switch flanks at regular intervals. Just to see them cut onto their stronger feet. They did switch at one point, but most of the time they stayed in their original positions. Poldi started quietly, with most of our attacks finding Theo’s runs in behind, but he slowly grew into the game. And unlike when we played for Germany at the Euros, he cut inside regularly and played more like a midfielder than a forward. His second goal showed his complete range of skills. The great pass, then the well timed run, and the powerful finish. In the second half, he played up front, and again he got involved with the midfield and his link up play was excellent. If RvP leaves, Poldi seems to be the replacement that resembles him most.

3. Giroud is a different type of striker. More of an out and out striker than Poldi or RvP. When our midfield had the ball he liked to stay up, always trying to make the run that would get him a chance to score. He did get a few chances, and he did put them on target, only for Horn to deny him. Even though he didn’t score, he looks a goalscorer.

4. Cazorla was immense. Our starting midfield was a bit unbalanced, neither Coquelin nor Chamberlain looking perfectly comfortable with the defensive side of things. But overall we kept the ball really well, and found the runs of Giroud and Walcott really well. Cazorla wa a joy to watch in possession. Never giving the ball away, playing long balls with both feet, dribbling out of trouble with ease. It is exciting to think of him and Wilshere together in midfield. Along with Arteta, we would never lose the ball.

5. We didn’t seem to miss RvP. Last season we were a one man team. Well, not really, but he was the only one who could be relied upon to score goals. Against Cologne, the whole team looked up for it. Podolski, Giroud, Walcott, Cazorla – all looked like legitimate goal threats. And then even Gervinho got himself a wondergoal.

So as it stands it looks like we have a pretty good team. Yes, I know, I know, can’t judge too much from a friendly, but the initial signs are good. The only downside at the moment is the fact that we aren’t physically 100% fit to start to the season. But Sunderland at home isn’t the toughest test so hopefully our super awesome team can pull off the 3 points, with or without RvP.

Analyzing Arsenal’s Alex Song – DM or Playmaker?

“He is Arsenal’s only defensive midfielder.”
“Song is not a DM.”
“Wenger should sign M’Vila so Song can play further forward.”
“Now that we signed Cazorla Song can focus on sitting back.”

I’ve read so many conflicting opinions on Alex Song. It is a bit surprising how much he divides opinion. The controversy isn’t really about whether Song is a good player or not. The general consensus seems to be that he is not the greatest player but still an important one. The argument mainly surrounds his true role in the Arsenal midfield, the cause for which is simply that Song is a capable, versatile player, who is comfortable in different roles (like most of our midfielders).

But where should he play? How does he fit into Arsenal’s tactics? I think he is, despite his creativity, a holding midfielder, not a playmaker. He is a very good midfielder too, but needs to improve in some key areas before he can be considered world class.

Let’s look at what kind of player Alex Song is. Whoscored.com’s profile offers us a good summary of his skills and style. According to the profile, Song has no weaknesses (that might be a bit optimistic). His strengths are passing, dribbling, and aerial duels. He likes to play short passes (obvious), likes to tackle, but also commits fouls often. His overall rating is a 7.07, playing mostly in a DM role. He is versatile, too, comfortable playing at center half as well as midfield (if he does ever move to Barcelona, I expect they will play him in the back line).

The overall rating is interesting because he is far behind his midfield partner for the 11/12 season, Mikel Arteta, who is rated at 7.5. It is important to mention Arteta because he greatly influenced Alex Song’s role in the team last season. Wenger likes to play Song as the deepest midfielder. In fact, at the end of the 10/11 season, and most of the pre-season that followed, Arsenal played a 1-2 shape in midfield, with Song sitting behind Ramsey and Wilshere (later Rosicky). When we signed Arteta, he turned out to be very good at winning the ball, holding on to it and distributing it accurately. Song was more comfortable finding RvP and Walcott’s runs and providing them with through balls. So Wenger adapted by shifting the midfield to a 2-1 shape. Arteta and Song shared the holding midfield roles, rotating offensive and defensive duties.

So tactically, Song was a DM, but allowed to push up when needed. Arteta doing a good job of covering for him when he did. But even without Arteta, Wenger likes his midfield to rotate, for the deepest midfielder to push forward. It is a good way to catch the defence out as the deepest midfielder is often unmarked. When enquired about Alex Song’s more attacking role in the 10/11 season, Wenger remarked that he “wanted to fool the opposition into trouble.”

It is a good defensive strategy, too. When United visited the Emirates in May 2011, Song played behind Ramsey and Wilshere, but constantly pushed up to end up at the tip of the triangle. Rooney was clearly instructed to man-mark Song, and he would follow Song on his forays forward, deep into his own half. Yes, our defensive midfielder spent most of the time in the final third, but United’s goalscorer and playmaker also spent a lot of time at the edge of his own box.

In our midfield, the holding midfielder isn’t just allowed to push forward, he is required to. Midfield rotation is a good way to make it harder for the opposition to deal with us. It infuriates fans to see Song caught too high up the pitch as we fall victim to another counter attacking goal, but that is part of the role Song performs. And last season more than ever, in the absence of a true playmaker, he was required to contribute in the final third. What perhaps needs work is our midfield cohesion, chemistry, and communication. When one goes forward, another needs to be aware and drop back. Decision making is perhaps also an issue. But what it comes down to is not necessarily individual indiscipline, but rather lack of teamwork and tactical cohesion.

While he is certainly capable of pushing forward from deep, I wouldn’t be inclined to start him in an advanced position. Song is a good passer, good dribbler, but not good enough to play high up in midfield where there is less space and time. The deeper position suits him from an attacking point of view. He has more time, he isn’t too tightly marked, and can see the whole field ahead of him. He doesn’t have the technique to play as a no.8 or a no.10.

And that lack of technique works against him in the holding midfield role too. His passing percentage was just under 84% for last season, a far cry from the 90+% Mikel Arteta put up every week. You might say that’s because Song was more creative, playing more passes forward. But Arteta had more key passes per game, too (1.4 per game to Song’s 0.9). The fact is, Song can play some nice silky passes, but unfortunately his passing is too inconsistent. He often plays the wrong pass or just simply gives it away.

And this is where his weaknesses as a defensive midfielder become apparent. A no.6, a DM, is supposed to be a reliable distributor of the ball. This is important in defensive and attacking terms. Get the ball safely up the pitch, away from danger, and in the process build up attacking moves. Arteta does this really, really well. Hence why he often was our deepest midfielder. To really be a world class DM, Song needs to seriously improve in this aspect of his game. It is telling that without Arteta last season, Song struggled to control the midfield and we were outpassed and outplayed in the center of the pitch. Song is a good passer, but for Arsenal’s high standards, he falls short of being good enough.

Without the ball, Song is a strong tackler, but doesn’t seem to be the most reliable ball winner. Sometimes he seems to position himself poorly, but how much of that is down to him individually is debatable. What is his weakness individually is that he seems to be a little too willing to foul players. Taking a yellow card for the team is admirable, but too many and it becomes a problem. Song gets too many.  Another area where he needs to improve.

Song is a good player, but not an automatic pick in the first team anymore. Arteta’s experience and discipline was key last season. Diaby can provide the strength for the physical battles. Wilshere is a more dynamic, creative option. All of them are better technical players too. But Song has improved so much since the time he joined, and continues to add extra dimensions to his game every season. He is only 24, and if he can continue to improve he could definitely make the step up to being world class.

At the moment he fits well into Arsenal’s midfield as a holding midfielder. That is his best position. But he needs a partner who can lead him and help cover for his weaknesses. I expect him to continue to be a regular presence next season but it remains to be seen if he can make the step up and become a truly dominant force in Arsenal’s midfield.

Wenger’s New Signings: End of Arsenal’s Youth Policy or the Beginning?

Much was made of Wenger’s summer business last year. The “panic buys.” There was criticism of them being too cheap, not good enough for Arsenal. But there was also a bit of back-handed praise, as the signings were older, more mature, more experienced. Wenger had learned his lesson from Cesc and Nasri’s departures, and had completely changed his transfer policy, abandoned his principles.

And they say that it has continued this summer. Podolski, Giroud, Cazorla again around 26 -27 years of age, all recognized and established players. “Ready made” players. The youth policy is definitely over.

Or is it?

Here’s the thing – this is the beginning of Arsenal’s real youth policy. This transfer policy that we have now is what Wenger always wanted. Signing established players, while the youth is promoted from within. We still continue to give youth a chance, but instead of buying players at 18 or 19 and filling our squad up with them, we will focus on homegrown players, and dip into the transfer market to fill in the gaps with established players.

Gibbs, Wilshere, Djourou, Szczesny, Afobe, Aneke, Lansbury, Frimpong, Bartley, are all players to come out of the Arsenal academy. They will all get a fair chance in the first team, but as we cannot rely on them at the moment, or even for all of them to be good enough at all, signings will be made to fill in the gaps in the first team. Hence signings like Arteta, Podolski, Cazorla.

The philosophy is simple: Grow your own players, and only if you need to, reach outside and bring in players that fit your style of play.

But why didn’t make such signings before? A signing like Podolski or Cazorla would be unheard of 2 or 3 years ago, when we were signing players like a 17 year-old Aaron Ramsey and shoving them into the first team straight away.

And that is true, as Chelsea, and later Man City, priced many players out of our reach, and the stadium debt left us slightly short on cash, Wenger focused more on younger signings. But he still signed established players like Arshavin, Gallas and Rosicky, and unknown but experienced players like Eduardo, Sagna, and Hleb. And the bias towards younger signings was always a temporary measure. The goal was still the same – to strike the right balance between grooming young players and signing experience.

Now it seems we’re finally getting the balance right. We “kept the powder dry” last summer as Gazidis said, and we’ve used it well this season to sign the players the squad desperately needs. To be fair, transfers involve a lot of luck and we were lucky this time with Giroud’s laughably low buy-out clause, and the financial mess at Malaga (although we supposedly lost out on Hazard and Kagawa). If the stars hadn’t aligned we might have ended up signing only 17 year-old Niang and people would have accused Wenger of putting too much trust in youth again.

 

Chamakh Wants to Stay at Arsenal – Should He Stay or be Sold?

Unsurprisingly, there has been a lot of moaning and groaning at Marouane Chamakh’s words about wanting to stay and fight for the team. I can see where they’re coming from, but I don’t agree with it. The popular view with the Arsenal fans seems to be that Chamakh is a failed striker, incapable of contributing to the team, and is only sticking around to eat up the wage bill and smoke Hooka. But what if I told you, Chamakh isn’t as bad as you think?

Now I will not make any excuses for Chamakh. He’s just coming off of a very poor season for any striker. Just that one goal against Blackburn, right? On the face of it the only option seems to be “ret rid.”But if we look a little closer, or farther back, we can see that Chamakh can actually produce the goods for the first team. So if Chamakh thinks that through hard work he can recapture that form and help the team in some way we can’t begrudge him that. But the question is, can he? I think he actually possibly could.

The thing is that strikers are judged on goals, and Chamakh was never a goalscorer. Even in Ligue 1 he didn’t have a great scoring record, and whatever goals he did score he seemed to score with his head. And we can see that when he plays his shooting technique is pretty poor for a striker, and so is his movement inside the box.

But the other thing is that he was never brought in to be a goalscorer. Wenger said that the main responsibility for a striker in a 4-5-1 is to involve the midfielders in the attack. Chamakh does that very well. He has more strength than RvP and he holds the ball up well. Wins more headers off goal kicks and long balls to knock down for teammates, and his link up play in and around the box is great.

In the 10-11 season, around him he had Arshavin, Nasri, Fabregas, and Walcott banging in the goals. We didn’t need a striker who necessarily scored goals, but who was capable of bringing these players into play and helping them score. Chamakh did just that and we had a pretty decent start to the season.

In 11-12, we lost our goalscoring midfield. RvP was the only one scoring, making it impossible to drop him, even for a rest. Chamakh would come on and do his usual thing, laying off chances for others, but who was there to take them? Chamakh wasn’t a brilliant player, but he offered the team something it needed. Last season the team needed goalscorers, and Chamakh wasn’t one.

Chamakh’s failure, perhaps, was in that he was never able to adapt and improve. In Ligue 1 being a target man and a provider was enough. In the EPL you needed to be more than that to be a top class striker.

The worrying thing for Chamakh is that Podolski and Giroud are better overall strikers than him, and they have to be considered favorites for 1st and 2nd choice. Giroud is even a better plan B, having a far superior record of winning aerial duels. But if our midfield starts firing again at least somewhat, Chamakh could again become a useful option. If RvP’s departure will give him a new sense of motivation, and he is willing to work hard and fight for his place, then I think we shouldn’t mind keeping him and letting him contribute in whatever way he can.